Category Archives: Competition Law

Harmony In Antitrust : Insights to the settlement and commitment mechanism under the competition amendment act 2023

ABSTRACT

This paper comprehensively examines the new Settlement and Commitment framework introduced in the Competition Amendment act, 2023. Throughout the course of this, it has been substantially explained how such an introduction marks a significant step towards enhancing enforcement efficiency of the Competition Commission of India (CCI).

Settlements are an important procedural tool because they let the entities and the target parties resolve their disputes effectively, quickly, and thoroughly. And improvement in behavioral conduct on any entity is sought by the commitment. However, The test for an acceptable settlement and commitment, therefore, is whether it addresses the anticompetitive conduct in a way that eliminates the harm and prevents its recurrence. The CCI in its procedure as discussed further in this paper establishes affirmation for such test

Companies do not have to engage themselves in the long drawn-out process of litigation. The expanding necessity of applying alternative dispute resolution approaches to the field of competition law and this paper it is grasped by starting with the definition and outlining a few real-life case scenarios. The comparison of this act with other nations and under other statutes helps to clarify the inspiration and influence of such a framework.

The competition law has always been dynamic and changing itself according to growing economic tendencies of the Indian market. The CCI has been always granted a high magnitude of powers when it comes to adjudicating a case, and such powers have been amended as per the growing needs of the economy, such as this introduction of non-litigation factors of settlement and commitment in the highly tech-globalized world.

INTRODUCTION

The primary means of enforcement under the Competition Act 2002 were conducting investigations, gathering evidence, and bringing legal action until this modification was passed. It took Competition Commission of India(hereinafter referred to as CCI) around six years in 2018 to pass the final order in India Glycols Limited v. Indian Sugar Mills Association and Others, where, The CCI had imposed penalties upon 18 sugar mills and 2 Associations (Indian Sugar Mills Association and Ethanol Manufacturers Association of India) allegedly rigging the bids in a joint tender for the purchase of ethanol for gasoline blends that Oil Marketing Companies (HPCL, BPCL, and IOCL) issued on January 2, 2013.[1]

Also, it took around seven years to pass the final order in East India Petroleum Private Limited v. South Asia LPG Company Private Limited to pass the order.[2]

As per the CCI Annual Report 2016-17 (‘Report’), 129 cases were pending before the DG in the year 2016-2017. Pertinently, the Report notes the following: “It is observed that the investigations are taking increasingly more time for completion. This partly reflects inadequate staff strength in the office of the DG and partly reflects increasing complexity of cases being referred to the DG by the Commission.”[3]  

Each of these instances demonstrates how the commission and the businesses used additional resources, both material and temporal. If the appropriate non-litigation procedure had been followed, this might have been prevented.

The Madras High Court in the case of Tamil Nadu Film Exhibitors Association v. CCI 2015 , held that the Competition Act’s framework permits parties to reach a compromise or settlement, and the CCI may accept such a compromise or settlement. “If for instance, a party which is held guilty of entering into an Anti-Competitive Agreement or abusing its dominant position comes up before the Commission and agrees for the discontinuance of the agreement with an undertaking not to re-enter into such agreements or to indulge in the abuse of dominant position, we see no reason as to why the same should not be accepted by the Commission.”[4]

Having taken inspiration from all the cases above, it was highly necessary to incorporate provisions of settling cases outside the purview of court.

The Settlement & Commitment structure was established in order to prevent large amount of time from being spent on antitrust problems during the litigation process. It contains characteristics that cause the market to correct more quickly. Without sacrificing the integrity of justice, these mechanisms have expedited the competition law while simultaneously streamlining it.

Section 48A (specifically talks about settlements) – (1) Any enterprise, against whom any inquiry has been initiated under sub-section (1) of section 26 for contravention of sub-section (4) of section 3 or section 4, may, for settlement of the proceeding initiated for the alleged contraventions, submit an application in writing to the Commission in such form and upon payment of such fee as may be specified by regulations

Section 48 B (specifically talks about offering commitments)such measures that will be taken by the party to address the concerns of the Commission by paying a certain amount of fees for the application.[5]

Commitment, as used in competition law jurisprudence, describes a procedure when an under-investigation corporation proposes to modify its business practices to meet the issues brought forth by the competition authority. Without a formal finding of infringement, this may result in the investigation being closed.[6]

In a settlement, the company and the competition authority negotiate a settlement that usually entails the corporation admitting to the alleged infringement in exchange for a reduction in fines or penalties. Although the Competition Amendment Act’s settlement procedure does not actually require acknowledgment of guilt. Businesses that have been waiting for this will quickly take advantage of it rather than dragging out lengthy legal battles.

Section 48 before the amendment act did not require the parties to acknowledge their involvement in anti-competitive behavior. If found guilty of the violation, they could face legal action and punishment directly without having scope of settling in between.

Jayant Sinha, who headed the committee that recommended changes for the amendment in the Competition Act, in an interview contended that solving disputes through non litigation methods is a global practice, and a need of flexibility is to be given to the parties so that they can negotiate on their terms, therefore the new feature of flexibility is given and the admission of guilt is not necessarily mandated. These kinds of procedures should help the CCI expedite the resolution of antitrust cases, freeing up its limited resources in the process. Businesses can also stay away from ambiguity and drawn-out inquiries. In addition to providing victims with fair compensation, these negotiated remedies give authorities the ability to impose creative deterrents on responders.   

He also says that such provision is a landmark reform and an extraordinarily important step forward for competition law as it immediately brings us up to world-leading standards and paves a way to settle matters without going into a long drawn out set of proceedings from CCI, NCLAT, and Supreme Court [7]

PROCEDURE FOLLOWED-

In settlement of proceedings initiated for any alleged contravention, the alleged violator can submit an application in writing to the commission in such form and upon payment of such fee as may be specified by regulations. This settlement application has to be given after the Director General(DG)  issues a report under section 26. This report will be based on his findings and the investigation the DG has done up uptil now, the settlement application has to be given before the commission passes the final order if it thinks that it is in contravention of sections 3 and 4.

Initially, the CCI will establish a preliminary view regarding its approval of the commitment application or settlement application, depending on the situation. The applicant has 15 days to submit a revised proposal if the CCI is not pleased. Thereafter, the CCI shall invite third parties (including counter parties and the DG) to submit their opinion within 21 days.[8]

It is upon the commission to consider such application basing itself on the nature, gravity and impact of such contraventions. CCI will provide for an opportunity to the third parties before grant of such application, which includes the director general, and the opposite party. For such an application to be accepted by the commission, the opposite party can submit their objection and suggestions to such settlement procedure.

If the commission finds it appropriate to not proceed with such an application, it can continue with the proceeding under section 26.

There can be no appeal made under section 53 b (appeal to appellate tribunal) i.e. the national company law appellate tribunal.  Once settlement and commitment are to be sought there is no appeal that can be made. The parties have to agree on that being the final decision. The benefit of this is twofold in the sense that the CCI can now move to other matters, and the companies can proceed with their work thus not affecting their efficiency.

“The ability to have a negotiated agreement and not having the ability to appeal it makes the amendment extraordinary.” Says Jayant Sinha.

A commitment procedure is to be initiated after the receipt of such information when the prime facie order is to be issued but before the receipt of the DG Report by the parties.

In the Commitment application, the alleged violator would have to provide the true and complete facts, including the gravity and impact of the contraventions and how the commitments offered would talk about the claimed infractions as well as the procedures for carrying out and keeping an eye on the promises made. The CCI may rescind its commitment or settlement order (and the investigation will restart) in the event that a party does not follow the terms of the agreement, does not disclose all relevant information, or if there is a major change in the facts. Additionally, the party will be responsible for covering the CCI’s legal expenses up to INR 10 million (about USD 120,000 / EUR 110,000).

In order to address the anticompetitive impacts of the alleged breach, commitments or settlement terms, as the case may be, can be created to restore competition through actions like divestitures and behavioral adjustments. Those impacted by the alleged anti-competitive actions have been given a voice by allowing comments from the other parties, and more transparency in antitrust enforcement has been sought.[9]

Such settlement amount to be credited to the consolidated fund of India

The Amendment Bill gives third parties the right to sue for damages or losses they have suffered under Section 53N of the Act in situations where the CCI issues a settlement order.

Section 48C deals with an applicant who fails to comply with the order passed under section 48A or section 48B or when it comes to the notice of the Commission that the applicant has not made full and true disclosure or there has been a material change in the facts, the order passed under section 48A or section 48B, as the case may be, shall stand revoked and withdrawn and such enterprise shall be liable to pay legal costs incurred by the

Commission which may extend to rupees one crore and the Commission may restore or initiate the inquiry in respect of which the order under section 48A or section 48B was Passed.[10]

QUANTUM OF PENALTY THAT WILL BE IMPOSED

Previously, As per the Competition Act of 2002, the penalty levied by CCI could not exceed 10 percent of the mean “turnover” for the three preceding financial years.

But in the Excel Crop case, the Supreme Court held that the quantum of penalty has to be restricted to not more than 10 percent of the “relevant turnover” of the erring enterprise on grounds of proportionality to the violation. The “relevant turnover” had been defined as the turnover pertaining to the products or services (and the geography) for which the anti-competitive conduct of the parties relates to. This had a negative impact on the intended deterrent effect that such penalties should have had in the market as well as drastically reducing the scope of penalties that the CCI would have imposed.[11] 

However, in the Excel Crop case, the Supreme Court ruled that, to be proportionate to the infraction, the penalty amount must be limited to no more than 10% of the “relevant turnover” of the offending firm. The turnover related to the goods or services (as well as the region) for which the parties’ anti-competitive behavior is relevant was previously referred to as the “relevant turnover.” This had a negative impact on the intended deterrent effect that such penalties should have had in the market as well as drastically reducing the scope of penalties that the CCI would have imposed.

The 2023 Amendment Act has “restored” the CCI’s authority to levy fines based on a party’s worldwide turnover. This was essential to making the non-adjudicatory methods more appealing to the parties.

Therefore, the enhanced criminal authority of the CCI is a desirable development that would not only strengthen the effect of deterrence against violations of competition law but also serve as a driving force behind the adoption of the mechanisms for commitment and settlement.

SIMILAR FRAMEWORK IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES

Similar tools are already in place in several other jurisdictions such as the European Union, United Kingdom, USA Germany, Japan, and  Italy.

  1. United States of America – Settlements are reached by working out the parameters of the remedy, drafting a precise and binding judgment, and then coming to an agreement with the parties, who consent to be bound by the final order’s terms, waive their rights to additional proceedings, and admit certain facts to establish jurisdiction. The agencies additionally publish or submit a complaint detailing pertinent details and claiming that the involved parties broke the law.  In the US, a settlement can only be accepted under specific circumstances. They’re as follows:

(A) A cartel is in place In order to enter into a plea agreement with the Antitrust Division, the defendant must be willing to

(B) admit guilt or provide a factual basis for the plea;

(C) Cooperation of the cartel participants (the inclusion in the cartel settlement of agreements by the settling party to provide full, continuing, and complete cooperation)  

(D) Promise by the Government not to bring further charges

In India, it is not required to acknowledge guilt.

  1. European Union – The European Commission (EC) allows commitment judgments in all antitrust matters whereas for cartels, the settlement route is available.However, in India, all antitrust issues would be settled, barring cartels. Cartels may choose to go for leniency. Further, while a settlement decision establishes an infringement and requires an admission of guilt from the parties, a commitment decision does not establish an infringement and does not require any admission by the parties. In India such admission of guilt is not necessary. EC notes that typically parties opt for a settlement decision when they are convinced of the strength of the EC’s case in view of the evidence gathered during investigation and of their own internal audit. In such cases, they may be ready to admit their participation in a cartel and accept liability for it. It was brought to the notice of the Committee that between May 2004 to February 2014, the EC adopted 34 commitment decisions and 19 infringement decisions[12] These procedures have proved to be more efficient and lead to quicker resolutions, since findings are not contested and the EC in particular can avoid the need, to draft detailed infringement decisions.For non-cartel behavior, the EC also uses an informal “cooperation procedure” in which infringement is found, structural remedies are imposed, and the parties receive a 30 percent reduction in fines in exchange for their cooperation.
  2. LENIENCY, CARTEL, SETTLEMENT – Experts in India assert that cartelization is considered a grave offense, which is likely the reason it is excluded from the settlement plan. “There is already a clause that allows persons involved in cartels to come clean about their behavior and receive mercy on their punishment. According to Amol Kulkarni, head of research at CUTS International, a non-profit, non-governmental organization that works on public interest issues, “keeping cartels out of the proposed settlement scheme could be a balancing act.”[13]

Section 46 of the Competition Act 2023 contains the Leniency Regulations, which provide that an entity requesting leniency must not only make essential disclosures but also stop participating in the cartel (unless instructed otherwise by the CCI) and provide full cooperation to the CCI.  Throughout the investigation and other processes before the CCI, such cooperation is necessary.  Furthermore, the requester for leniency shall not remove, alter, destroy, or hide any pertinent material related to the cartel.[14]

  1. JAPAN: The Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) is empowered by the Anti-Monopoly Act (AMA) of Japan to formally accept voluntary promises from businesses that may have violated the law. Following notification, companies have sixty days to present proposed commitments and provide proof that the alleged infringement has stopped. Companies can utilize the process without having to admit that there has been an infringement. Therefore, it is not required to admit responsibility here either. The settlement process for cartel and bid-rigging charges is procedural; first, a leniency application is filed, and if it is approved, an application for negotiation is made.
  1. United Kingdom– National authorities in Europe have also heavily relied on these mechanisms for antitrust enforcement. In February 2022, the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) accepted commitments from Google in relation to the Privacy Sandbox for its Chrome browser.  The CMA is presently reviewing promises made by Google on its Play Store billing policies as part of a separate probe.
  1. Germany – In its eleventh amendment act, the German Competition Act (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, or GWB) provided a number of remedies, including structural and behavioral modifications. Unlike CAA2023, which typically arises when there is a violation, these are introduced not just for cases where infringement has happened but also for market conditions that necessitate solutions. It recently accepted commitments offered by the German Olympic Sports Confederation and International Olympic Committee in respect of advertising restrictions imposed on the participants in the Olympic games and companies.
  1. ITALY- The Italian Competition Authority also offers a settlement procedure that allows businesses accused of engaging in anti-competitive agreements or practices to do so. This conforms to the criteria set by Europe. The settlement procedure’s goals are to expedite the legal process and give the parties the opportunity to receive a reduction in penalty. Parties may benefit from a 10% reduction in fines for settling with the ICA if the ICA aligns its process with the European Commission’s.[15]

SIMILAR MECHANISM UNDER DIFFERENT STATUTES

In order to keep up with the increasing number of litigation cases and lessen the workload for courts and tribunals, section 48 draws inspiration from various statutes as well. This allows for a concentration on more important cases rather than wasting time, effort, and resources on less serious harms.

The Securities and Exchange Board of India’s (SEBI) 2018 Regulations – gives SEBI more latitude to resolve some serious offenses, with the exception of situations that could have an impact on the entire market, result in losses for a significant number of investors, or compromise the integrity of the market. Additionally, it concentrates on increasing transparency in investor-related settlement matters (such as disclosure violations, refunds, and exit alternatives) and, for the first time, established a confidential settlement in exchange for assistance from SEBI in its investigations. [16] 

The Income Tax Act, 1961 also sets out a settlement framework – Any assessee who is the subject of an ongoing legal case before an income-tax authority may submit an application in the required format to the Settlement Commission in order to resolve the matter. The application cannot be withdrawn once it has been filed, and it must be submitted with the required fee. The aims are to decrease litigation, guarantee prompt tax collection, and give taxpayers the tools they need to clean house through negotiation and settlement. It is a crucial alternative dispute resolution procedure for settling tax disagreements involving direct taxes.

Vivad-se-wishwas is yet another significant plan. This program, “Vivad se Vishwas II – (Contractual Disputes),” was introduced by the Ministry of Finance’s Department of Expenditure, a one time settlement scheme, to efficiently resolve outstanding contractual disputes involving the government and government-affiliated enterprises. [17]

CRITICAL FACTORS

1. Can the parties fear that their application will be used as evidence against them if rejected? The parties do not necessarily have to admit to their guilt as per the provisions. Following a thorough discussion, the Standing Committee recommended against requiring a party to “admit guilt” in exchange for agreeing to resolve a dispute or make promises.

However, Parties considering entering a plea for settlement should be mindful of the possibility of follow-on claims for damages. This possibility should be based on the nature, gravity, and future consequences of the alleged violation done.

Follow-on cases are claims for damages where the infringement of competition law has already been established by a competition authority

The CCI may utilize information disclosed in a settlement or commitment application against the relevant applicants or any other persons involved in the investigation who are not involved in the settlement or commitment procedures.

The investigation into the remaining infractions will continue, although in some circumstances, the settlement application or the commitment application, as the case may be, may be approved in connection to some (but not all) of the infractions mentioned in the DG’s investigation report.

The Draft Settlement Regulations stipulate that a settlement order shall not be regarded as a finding of contravention, even when a settlement will not prejudice the damages procedures.  This means that applicants may have difficulties proving loss as a settlement applicant in the event of follow-on damages. [18]

2. The fact that the amendment ignores the settlement in cartels is a significant disadvantage.   For corporations who would have preferred to settle out of court, including cartels would have been a practical step toward closing the proceedings. The claim that “cartels” benefit from leniency fails to recognize the fundamental distinction between leniency—a technique for starting investigations—and settlements, which are an effective means of bringing a lawsuit to an end.

Author : Utkarsha Rananaware, A studentat ILS Law College, in case of any queries please contact/write back to us via email to chhavi@khuranaandkhurana.com or at IIPRD


[1]   India Glycols Limited v. Indian Sugar Mills Association and Others 2018.

https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1546553

[2]   Manupatra, S.J. and Kumari, S. (no date) Manupatra, Articles. Available at: https://articles.manupatra.com/article-details/THE-SETTLEMENT-AND-COMMITMENT-SC-MECHANISM-AN-ANTIDOTE-FOR-THE-PREMATURE-BUSINESS-FRIENDLY-POLICY-OF-CCI (Accessed: 19 January 2024).

[3]  The need for settlements and commitments under the Competition Act (no date) azb. Available at: https://www.azbpartners.com/bank/the-need-for-settlements-and-commitments-under-the-competition-act/ (Accessed: 19 January 2024).

[4] Tamil Nadu Film Exhibitors Association v. CCI (2015)

http://www.scconline.com/DocumentLink/js2SjZ2X

[5] Competition Amendment Act 2023, Section 48 https://www.cci.gov.in/images/publications_booklet/en/competition-amendment-act-2023-salient-features1684831868.pdf

[6]  CCI Draft regulations https://www.cci.gov.in/images/whatsnew/en/background-note-settlement1692847181.pdf

[7] CNBC (2022) Available at :  

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b4xiF1HsECM

[8] Prateek, P., Verma, T. and Vohra, R. CCI publishes draft regulations on settlement and commitment mechanism, Khaitan & Co. Available at: https://www.khaitanco.com/thought-leaderships/CCI-Publishes-Draft-Regulations-on-Settlement-and-Commitment-Mechanism (Accessed: 5 January 2024).

[9] Guest Contributor (2023) Financialexpress, Opinion News | The Financial Express. Available at: https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/a-new-era-of-competition-law-not-only-does-this-compel-violators-to-make-amends-but-also-gives-those-affected-a-voice/3286598/ (Accessed: 15 January 2024).

[10]https://www.cci.gov.in/images/publications_booklet/en/competition-amendment-act-2023-salient-features1684831868.pdf

[11] Excel Crop Care Limited v. Competition Commission of India & Anr., (2017) 8 SCC 47

[12] Competition law review committee report page 45, 2019

[13] Prasad, G.C. (2023) Cartels may be kept out of settlement purview, mint. Available at: https://www.livemint.com/news/india/cartels-may-be-kept-out-of-settlement-purview-11675963419838.html (Accessed: 29 January 2024).

[14] Kakkar, A.K. and Chauhan, V.P.S. (2023) Cartels & Leniency Laws and Regulations Report 2024, International Comparative Legal Guides International Business Reports. Available at: 

https://iclg.com/practice-areas/cartels-and-leniency-laws-and-regulations/india (Accessed: 29 January 2024).

[15]  Vassallo, G. et al. (2023) Main developments in competition law and Policy 2022 – italy, Kluwer Competition Law Blog. Available at: https://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2023/05/05/main-developments-in-competition-law-and-policy-2022-italy/ (Accessed: 29 January 2024).

[16] Gazal Rawal, R.G. (2022) Amendments to sebi settlement regime – a snapshot, India Corporate Law. Available at: https://corporate.cyrilamarchandblogs.com/2022/01/amendments-to-sebi-settlement-regime-a-snapshot/ (Accessed: 29 January 2024).

[17] Government launches a one-time settlement Scheme Vivad se Vishwas – II (Contractual Disputes) to effectively settle pending contractual disputes, as announced in the Union Budget 2023-2, 2023

https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1945072#:~:text=The%20Department%20of%20Expenditure%2C%20Ministry,by%20the%20Union%20Finance%20Minister.

[18] DRAFT CCI (SETTLEMENT) REGULATIONS, 2023  https://www.cci.gov.in/images/whatsnew/en/background-note-settlement1692847181.pdf

Can Situations Of Outright Refusal To Deal Be Equated To Constructive Refusal? – The Question of Indispensability under the Eu Competition Law.

ABSTRACT

The paper explores the complex legal environment that surrounds refusal to deal under EU law, focusing on the differences between constructive and outright refusal. While constructive refusal builds restrictions that effectively prevent competitors from operating downstream, outright refusal indicates a company’s unilateral refusal to engage in transactions. The EU makes clear that margin squeeze and tying are two different types of abuses. Self-preferencing, or favoring one’s own products above competitors’, is defended by claims of property protection and contractual freedom. The indispensability requirement, which is crucial in evaluating outright rejections, is contested; the EU court has determined that it is not always necessary in specific situations involving access restrictions. This strategy is criticized, meanwhile, for being inconsistent and having the ability to discourage investment incentives.

INTRODUCTION

Situations, where a firm discriminates in favour of its products to the detriment of its rivals, must be defined as self-preferencing and is a form of refusal to supply and should be treated the same way. The EU commission must consider that the guidance paper on Article 82 of the treaty is not meant to be a legal declaration and does not affect how the European Communities Court of Justice or Court of First Instance would interpret Article 82. Furthermore, the broad structure outlined in the text does not affect the Commission’s ability to reject a complaint if it determines that it is not in the best interests of the community and that the matter is not prioritized.

In order to assess whether situations, where the dominant company is self-preferencing, can be treated equally to an outright refusal, the EU courts must take into consideration the forms of self-preferencing taking place. The comission must also consider the benefit of consistency derived from the non-application of differential principles in cases of refusal to deal. RCA must also take into consideration the end idea of balancing competition and promoting innovation and incentives. This comes from the criterion of indispensability which guarantees the dominant firm the freedom of innovation and such freedom should not be restricted in case of self-preferencing or constructive refusals. Lastly, RCA must rely upon the fact that it is the indispensability criterion that provides dominant firms an incentive to innovate and invest and it remains essential for the indispensability criteria to be proven even in cases of constructive refusal to supply in order to preserve the incentive to innovate.

MAIN ARTICLE

The term outright refusal to deal has been understood as direct and complete denial to deal by a firm. On the contrary, a situation of constructive refusal to deal/supply would mean that a firm makes it practically impossible for its rival to operate downstream. In situations where a dominant firm consistently delays its deliveries, and degrades the quality of its inputs, differential and increased price for inputs to its rivals would constitute a constructive refusal to deal. The EU law has clarified that situations of margin squeeze and tying be treated as a separate form of abuse and not be categorized under any of the refusals as mentioned earlier.

However, situations, where a firm discriminates in favor of its products to the detriment of its rivals, defined as self-preferencing may also be backed by reason of (i) Freedom to Contract and, (ii) protection of private property.

The Union Courts have ruled that the indispensability criterion is not necessary in cases where the dominant firm has agreed to, or is required by regulatory obligations, to grant access to its input, as in the cases of margin squeeze (Telefónica, TeliaSonera)[1] , or it degrades the supply of the input and sets unfair terms and conditions (Slovak Telecom)[2] , or it otherwise unfairly restricts access (Google Shopping)[3] . According to the Court of Justice, the Bronner case’s indispensable criteria only applies to outright denials of supply—it does not apply to other abusive actions involving access requirements once access has already been granted[4].

Economic perspective on the application of indispensability: Numerous situations where a dominating corporation has an incentive to participate in vertical foreclosure have been recognized by economic research. These theories typically concentrate on situations in which a vertically integrated company has the exclusive right to the input, presuming that the input is necessary. However, this assumption is made for simplicity, because there are models where alternate input providers exist, even if they may be less effective. Furthermore, the existence of an upstream oligopoly is a fundamental component of the theory of harm in the “raising rivals’ costs” theory.4 12. Thus, from an economic point of view, a dominant firm can participate in vertical foreclosure, which has an anti-competitive effect, without the input having to be indispensable.

However, not only does the differential treatment of constructive refusal from an outright refusal to supply lacks consistency and run the risk of producing perverse incentives for enterprises, but it also has the potential to jeopardize investment incentives. Moreover, such differential treatment may also incentivize the firm to outrightly refuse access to the inputs as it is treated more leniently than a less exclusionary practice even though it is more restrictive.

The amended guidelines reflect that indispensability need not be proven in cases of constructive refusal to supply[5], self-preferencing, and margin squeeze. However, such an approach creates disbalance and inconsistency in the application of principles. The main rationale behind the application of the criterion of indispensability is the freedom to contract and the right to dispose of its property. The economic rationale behind the same is the preservation of incentive to invest and innovate which in most cases lies with the dominant firms, given the strong financial backbone. In such a case removal of criteria of indispensability from constructive refusal not only makes the firm obliged to share its inputs with its rivals but also gives a free–rider advantage to the rival firms to not invest in any innovations. This discourages the firm from sharing its inputs to not develop them in the first place[6].

There must be Homogenous protection to firms in all types of refusal as there lies no substantial valid justification that a firm not outrightly refusing to deal should not be given the same protection of criterion of indispensability as provided in cases of outright refusal. An effect-based approach should not treat differently any conduct that differs only in form but not in substance.

Since self-preferencing is a form of refusal to supply, it ought to be treated the same way as Similar to other forms of refusal, self-preferencing also has objective and efficiency justifications such as a delay may be backed by the reason of ensuring quality control or protection against a market negatively reputed due to the introduction of a product of any player or rival. (ii) In many situations, self-preferencing may not even have appreciable effects. Situations of delay in supply may be for a short duration time and be resolved later.

To summarize, the following conclusions can be drawn from the literature on exclusionary practices that were previously discussed: (a) the input in question for a vertical foreclosure action should be an important asset, but not necessarily indispensable in the sense of Bronner; (b) all vertical foreclosure cases, including cases involving both outright and constructive refusals to supply, should be governed by this principle.

Author : Jeevanaa .N. Rathor, in case of any queries please contact/write back to us via email to chhavi@khuranaandkhurana.com or at IIPRD

REFERENCES

  1. Telefónica SA v European Commission, Case C-274/12 P and Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB, Case C-52/09.
  2. Slovak Telekom, a.s. v European Commission, Case C-165/19 P, para 39
  3. Google and Alphabet v Commission, T-612/17
  4. Judgment of 25 March 2021, Slovak Telekom v Commission (Slovak Telekom), Case C-165/19 P, EU:C:2021:239, paragraphs 50-51 and judgment of 12 February 2023, Lietuvos geležinkeliai AB v European Commission, Case C-42/21 P, EU:C:2023:12, paragraphs 81-84 and 91.
  5. Official journal of the European union, INFORMATION AND NOTICES, Amendments to the Communication from the Commission – Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, C116 VOLUME 66, 2023, (2023/C 116/01), PG 4, PARA 4.
  6. Motta (2023) formalizes a model inspired by the Google Shopping case. There, the input is not essential, in the sense that a part of the user population needs access to the input, while the remaining part does not. Still, vertical foreclosure takes place and it is anti-competitive
  7. Communication from the Commission COMMISSION NOTICE Guidelines on vertical restraints 2022/C 248/01C/2022/4238
  8.  

[1] Telefónica SA v European Commission, Case C-274/12 P and Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB, Case C-52/09.

[2] Slovak Telekom, a.s. v European Commission, Case C-165/19 P, para 39

[3] Google and Alphabet v Commission, T-612/17

[4] Judgment of 25 March 2021, Slovak Telekom v Commission (Slovak Telekom), Case C-165/19 P, EU:C:2021:239, paragraphs 50-51 and judgment of 12 February 2023, Lietuvos geležinkeliai AB v European Commission, Case C-42/21 P, EU:C:2023:12, paragraphs 81-84 and 91.

[5] Official journal of the European union, INFORMATION AND NOTICES, Amendments to the Communication from the Commission – Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, C116 VOLUME 66, 2023, (2023/C 116/01), PG 4, PARA 4.

[6] Motta (2023) formalizes a model inspired by the Google Shopping case. There, the input is not essential, in the sense that a part of the user population needs access to the input, while the remaining part does not. Still, vertical foreclosure takes place and it is anti-competitive

Analyzing the Intersection of Competition Law and IPR

Significance of IPR and competition law in commercial environments: An overview

In today’s day and age, IPR plays a critical role in facilitating the trade and economy of every nation while ensuring that intangible properties such as creative works, trademarks and inventions are not exploited by unauthorized parties. Particularly, in a digitalized world like ours, ideas and innovations are susceptible to exploitation. Intellectual Property systems ensure that such ideas and innovations are not duplicated or stolen. Moreover, Intellectual Property also impacts the commercial growth of a business. Firstly, protecting your IP (such as trademarks, inventions and trade secrets) may add to the uniqueness and distinctiveness of a particular brand. Consequently, a business can use these IPs to obtain franchise agreements from other corporations. Obtaining franchise agreements may eventually contribute to the commercial growth of a company. Secondly, Intellectual Property systems can be used to obtain profits. For instance, patenting of innovations may lead to incentivizing the creators which forms a consistent stream of income. This stream of income can also be invested in further research and development, thus boosting the scope for innovation.

[]Image Source: gettyimages]

On the other hand, competition law lays down regulations and laws concerning the market competition in order to regulate anti-competitive practices that companies may partake in. Anti-competitive practices may include predatory pricing (imposing exorbitant prices on products or services that the consumer has limited choice other than to purchase it), price fixing (a collusion between competitors to set similar prices for products or services) and bid rigging (selection of winners of a contract in advance). The origin of competition law can be traced back to the Roman Empire in 50 B.C wherein competition laws were imposed in order to protect the grain industry and to prohibit the blockage of supply ships.

An outline on the linkage between IPR and competition law

Ensuring competitiveness in commercial environments

The rapid development of commercial environments have resulted in establishing a relationship between competition law and Intellectual Property Rights. As discussed earlier, IPR regulates the exclusive rights that a business or an individual may have over intangible assets pertaining to a business such as trademarks, innovations, trade secrets and creative works. Competition law, on the other hand, regulates acquisitions and mergers and safeguards commercial environments from anti-competitive practices. Moreover, IP is pro-competitive. This means that IP systems would help consumers make conscious choices with respect to the goods and services among competing brands that are available in the market. IP ensures that each brand is distinctive in nature and without IP enforcement, brands would attempt to copy each other’s business models and other aspects. In sum, it can be said that IP ensures that there exists competition in commercial environments. Facilitating competition in commercial environments is also one of the main roles of competition law. Hence, it can be said that IP and competition law may cumulatively ensure competition among brands in business environments.  

Exploring the coexistence between IP and competition law

While both IP and competition law facilitate similar goals, the interface between IP and competition law also poses several issues. For one, when IP laws are enforced upon non-differentiating features of a brand such as patents, trade secrets or other aspects of a business that does not add to the distinctiveness of a business, exclusivity follows. This essentially means that, enforcing IP laws on such features would grant exclusivity or monopoly over them. Typically, the principles and policies of competition law disagrees with the unduly extension and imposition of IP laws on all the facets of a business. At the same time, inadequate IP enforcement can also pose several issues in commercial environments. For instance, inefficient IP enforcement may negatively impact competitiveness among businesses. When the aspects that add to the distinctiveness of a business are not protected with the help of IP laws, duplication and imitation of the same may follow. The imitation and duplication of the various distinctive aspects that are linked to a business will result in inadequate competition between businesses which inherently goes against the principles of competition law. Thus, an inference can be drawn that there is a need to draw a balance between IP and competition law for both its principles to co-exist. IP is pro-competitive. Hence, IP enforcement that would balance the interests of both competitors as well as inventors and creators will facilitate adequate competition in commercial environments. 

Legalities concerning the interface of IP and competition laws

The role of the TRIPS agreement in IPR and competition law

The agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights is an international agreement between all the signatory countries of the World Trade Organization. The primary purpose of the TRIPS Agreement is to allow its member countries to provide an extensive level of protection over their IP. The TRIPS Agreement also elucidates upon the regulation of unfair competition and its relationship with IP rights. Article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement explains that any licensing practice or conditions that are related to Intellectual Property Rights may have a severe impact on trade and it may also act as a barrier when it comes to the transfer of technology. Moreover, Article 40.2 of the TRIPS Agreement permits its members to specify any form of abuse of IP rights that may have a negative impact and to adopt measures to prevent such adverse effects. Article 40.2 of the Agreement also permits its members to adopt measures against practices that may include (but is not restricted to) exclusive grant backs and coercive package licensing. However, the practices enlisted under Article 40.2 are not exhaustive.

Indian scenario with respect to competition and IPR laws

Section 3 of the Indian competition act explains that no enterprise or association of enterprises or person or association of persons can enter into any agreement with respect to the production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control of goods or provision of services that are likely to cause an adverse effect on competition within India. In India, the conflict between IP laws and competition laws can be noted through section 3(5) and section 4 of the Act. Section 3(5) of the Act deals with a blanket exception on IPR which implies that IP policies and competition laws do not interfere with each other. However, section 4 of the Act elucidates upon the abuse of dominant position which is interlinked to IP rights.

IPR and competition laws aim to regulate commercial environments while facilitating a common aim. IP laws ensure that each business is unique in nature while ensuring that the creators are adequately incentivized. Whereas, competition law ensures to strike a balance between the rights of manufacturers and the customers while restricting anti-competitive practices. It has been noted that IP laws may lead to the monopolization of a particular innovation or a creation and that this may be contrary to what competition law policies stand for. However, there are laws and agreements in place to regulate this. Thus, it can be concluded that inherently, IP laws and competition laws can coexist in commercial environments.

Author: Sanjana, a BBA LLB student of  Symbiosis Law School (Hyderabad), currently an intern at Khurana & Khurana, Advocates and IP Attorneys. In case of any queries please contact/write back to us at vidushi@khuranaandkhurana.com.

Vertical Overlaps in Merger Control

Introduction

Indian Competition Law permits the Competition Commission (CCI) to consider the nature and extent of Vertical Integration in the market, in order to determine whether a combination will (or would be likely to) cause an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC).[1]In this article, we discuss the compliance and reporting requirements applicable to parties to a combination,involved in different stages of the supply chain for a product or service, above a certain threshold, and compare the same with the disclosures to be made in case they do not surpass the threshold.

In India, in cases where a vertical overlap of more than 25% exists, the Acquirer (in case of an acquisition) or both parties jointly (in the case of a Merger) are required to file Form II,[2] which requires more detailed submissions and is used essentially in schemes of a large scale that would have a greater impact on the market. The fee payable along with the form is Rs. 50 Lakh.[3]

The parties must also give information, in requisite detail about all market segments involved in the transaction. When there are one or more markets where the overlaps are in excess of the thresholds, even if there are other markets where the thresholds aren’t met, information with respect to them must be filed in Form II.[4]

Summary of the Content of Forms I and II:

Form 1:

1. Basic Info

2. Proof of Payment of Fee

3. Authorisation regarding communication

4. Meeting the Thresholds (Assets + Turnover)

5. Summary in accordance with regulations 13 (1A & 1B)

6. Description of combination:

           a. Name of parties

           b. Structure

             i. Steps + Timelines

             ii. Structure ownership control

             iii. Value of transaction

          c. Purpose of combination

          d. Other jurisdictions

          e. Approval by board of directors

          f. Details and justification for Non-compete (if any)

7. Details about parties

          i. List of regd. entities in India

          ii. Name of group

          iii. Trading/Brand names in India

          iv. Activities worldwide

          v. Activities in India

             a. List of Products and Services

             b. Identical/Substitutable Products (Y/N) (Details if Y)

             c. Vertical Linkage (Y/N) (Details if Y)

             d. Horizontal/Vertical Linkage with another enterprise, which a party to the combination Has shareholding in.

             e. Brief overview of the sector

8. Relevant market (RM)

          a. Relevant Product + Geographic Market

          b. Whether the parties are engaged in business in the same RM

          c. Estimated size of RM

          d. Value of sales and the market share of each party in the RM

          e. Names of 5 Largest Competitors

f. If there is a vertical linkage:

             i. Market size of upstream & downstream market

             ii. Market share of each party in both

             iii. Market share of 5 largest competitors in the Upstream/Downstream market

             iv. Existing supply arrangements between the parties and its share in the relevant market

Form 2 Summary:

1. Summary

          a. rationale, objectives, strategy, and likely impact.

          b. Parties, Nature, Area of Activities, Market impacted, info relevant for 20(4), timeframe of combination.

2. Purpose

          a. Business Objectives – What & How

          b. Economic Rationale and Impact

3. Details of Payment

4. Personal (Contact) Details

5. Details about Combination

          a. Which clause u/s 5 of the Act

          b. Details about nature of comb.:

             i. Number + Percentage of Shares/Voting rights Acquired; whether the same would lead to control.

             ii. Value of Assets; whether leading to control

             iii. Details of constituent transactions in the comb.

6. Supporting docs.

          a. Docs supporting board approval of the scheme

          b. Docs analysing impact of acquisition on the market, competitors etc. after the comb.

          c. MoA, AoA of parties

          d. Annual Reports of parties (if section 5(b) is applicable, also of competing enterprises already controlled by acquirer)

          e. List of holders of 5% or more shares/voting rights in each party.

          f. Organisational chart and details of KMP

7. Size of Combination

          a. How are the criteria for filing notice for the combination met.

          b. Audited accounts of the immediately preceding two, as well as the currentfinancial year, separately for all parties (includes value of assets and aggregate turnover, in India and Worldwide)

          c. Aggregate audited and unaudited accounts for the proposed combination (in a similar way as above)

          d. Accounts of the Group to which the post combination entity would belong (in the same way as above)

8. Ownership & Control

          a. List of all enterprises in the group to which the parties belong; details of all enterprises controlling the parties.

          b. Whether a party to the combination controls another entity/group (Details if Yes)

          c. Details of Horizontal Linkages, if any.

          d. Details of Vertical Linkages, if any.

          e. Details of intended structure of ownership and control of parties and combined enterprise post completion.

9. Details about Products/Services

          a. Details of:

             i. List Products and Services

             ii. Characteristics; End use

             iii. Are the Parties Competitors in same RM?

             iv. Market Shares of parties and their competitors  (within RM)

             v. In-house consumption, if any

             vi. Existence/availability of other specialised producers

             vii. Industrial Classification of Products/Services

          b. Any Law/Regulation/Specification that:

             i. Restricts the operation of like products/services as the parties, in the RM.

             ii. Local specification applicable to the like products.

             iii. Licensing Requirements to set up production facilities; special technical knowledge

             iv. Govt. Procurement policies that offer special dispensation

          c. Importance and details of distribution channels

          d. Details of transportation (modes, cost etc.)

          e. Define limits of Product and Geographical RM and demarcate competitive products not included in the same.

          f. Manner in which the parties produce, price and sell their product; all documents related to the pricing for the previous two years and price forecasts post-combination.

          g. Pricing details for major competitors and imports

          h. Details about the minimum viable scale, minimum and optimum plant size, utilisation rate, available cost savings etc.

10. Information on Market Structure

          a. Market Sizein terms of value and volume, 5 Largest Competitors, Costumers, Suppliers.

          b. Market share of parties in the product RM.

          c. List of main competitors in RM

          d. List of all competitors having market share > 5% in the RM.

          e. Description of the state of competition in the RM

          f. Level of Concentration in RM before and after combination (HHI)

          g. List of enterprises which attempted entering or exiting (last 5 years) or are likely to enter (next 2 years) RM.

          h. If either party entered the RM in last 5 years, faced any barrier to entry?

   Factors influencing entry in the market:

             i. Total cost of entry

             ii. Non-recoverable investment on entry

             iii. Legal/regulatory barriers

             iv. IPR restrictions

             v. Details of IPRs developed by parties

             vi. Importance of economies of scale in RM

             vii. Access to sources of supply

          j. Information regarding volume and market share etc. of imports; details of potential imports to start in next 2 years; cost difference in domestic and imported products.

          k. Details of exports and their proportion in the RM for last 3 years; top 5 exporters.

          l. Details of largest suppliers to parties.

          m. Details of products/services in the pipeline for parties and competitors and its impact on market share.

          n. Details of Large buyers

          o. Demand structure in the RM; roles of product differentiation and switching costs.

          p. Language compliance requirements.

          q. Importance and details of R&D activities carried out by parties (present)

          r. Intended R&D activities subsequent to combination

          s. Details of ground-breaking technology or business models used by parties/competitors in RM

11. Compliance and filing in other jurisdictions

          a. Any order passed by any Competition/ State Authority involving the parties, in the last 5 years.

          b. Any bankruptcy/winding up petition filed by any party in last 5 years.

          c. Details and copies of the documents filed before other tribunals/ regulators with respect to the combination and the orders passed.

          d. If filing has to be done in jurisdictions other than India, details and copies of relevant documents including order/decision.

12. Any other information that could help the commission in this assessment.

Case Studies

In Alok Industries and Grabal Alok Impex[5], the commission found that “The Parties to the Combination are engaged in activities which are at different stages or levels of the production chain in the textile business and, in addition to providing products/services to other customers, sometimes provide products/ services to others also. It is however, observed that the sales and purchase of products/services of parties to the combination to/from each other is very small and out of the total sales and purchase of products and services of each of the parties to the combination, the sales and purchase of each to/from each other is also insignificant.” The Commission observed that the combination was not likely to have any “adverse competition concern.”

In Bayer’s acquisition of Monsanto, the commission passed an order under Section 31(7), accepting the proposed amendments to the Proposal for Modification issued by the CCI and approving the acquisition.[6] A quick look through some of the important observations in the order, would be worthwhile. It was noted that the Proposed Combination would create one of the largest vertically integrated player in the agricultural market globally.[7]

Resultantly, the commission observed that the acquisition could lead to AAEC in 8 Relevant Markets. Most importantly, Monsanto held a 95-100% of the upstream market for Bt. Cotton Trails in India and had a presence in the Downstream market too. Bayer was one of the very few competitors for Monsanto in the said upstream market and the acquisition would allow the combined entity to substantially foreclose access for other downstream seed companies.[8]The CCI approved the acquisition subject to a series of divestments to be made by both Bayer and Monsanto. They also required the licensing of certain products on FRAND terms. They were required not to bundle their products and commit to maintain non-exclusive distribution channels.[9]

Conclusion

The Competition Commission of India has set up a robust mechanism to differentiate combinations that would have or be likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition, from the ones which wouldn’t. When talking about restructuring schemes which involve significant (>25%) vertical overlaps, the process becomes much more onerous, and the regulator requires a multitude of disclosures and analyses, for the past present and future of the companies.

While it is critical to prevent certain Mergers & Acquisitions from impairing the competition between enterprises, the regulator, like many other instrumentalities of the state could make its process more conducive to business. Ample powers have been given to this statutory body, including carrying out an assessment of the anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominant position, at any point, even on its own motion and impose penalties, in case the enterprises manage to get away with a devious combination.It should replace the existing system of approval with something much less burdensome, and make the process quicker, to not end up causing an appreciable adverse effect on the free market.


Author: Mr. Anant Joshi, Associate – Corporate & Commercial Law Practice at Khurana & Khurana, Advocates and IP Attorneys. In case of any queries please contact/write back to us at anant@khuranaandkhurana.com


References:

[1]Section 2(4) (j) of the Competition Act, 2002.

[2]https://cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/cci_pdf/Form_II.docx.

[3]https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/whats_newdocument/FAQ%27s_Combinations.pdf.

[4]GE Company, GE Industrial France SAS, Alstom, Alstom Holdings (C-2015/01/241).

[5] No. C-2012/01/28.

[6]No. C-2017/08/523.

[7] Id, para 19. 

[8] Id, para 82.

[9] Id, paras 210,211.